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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant is charged with the criminal offense of knowingly pos-
sessing cocaine.' At the start of the jury trial, the prosecuting attorney
informs defense counsel that he intends to elicit testimony from a wit-
ness concerning previous incidents where the defendant had furnished
third parties with cocaine. The government seeks to admit this evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to establish the general criminal
intent of the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant expresses a will-
ingness to stipulate to the requisite intent. The prosecution refuses to
accept this offer on the grounds that the accused can not preclude the
government from presenting relevant collateral acts evidence before the
jury. Thereafter, as part of the government's case-in-chief, the witness
convincingly testifies that he observed the defendant supply third par-
ties, including minors, with cocaine on prior occasions. During its pres-
entation, the government offers sufficient evidence to support a finding
by the jury that the defendant committed this uncharged misconduct.
The defendant immediately objects to the admission of this damaging
evidence, arguing that his offer to stipulate removes the issue of intent
from the case, thus barring the admissibility of other acts evidencing
intent. Moreover, the defendant contends that intent is not a contested
issue because the crime charged does not require proof of specific intent
1. The author created this hypothetical for purposes of illustrating current judicial
application of the intent provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
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and he has not actively raised the issue of intent. Despite the absence of
a genuine need for the collateral acts evidence, the trial judge, undertak-
ing a Rule 403 balancing approach, overrules the objection. The court
finds the incremental probative worth of the other acts evidencing intent
substantial in view of the difficulties the government faces in proving its
case. The defendant contends that the extrinsic testimony is unfairly
prejudicial in comparison to its limited probative worth. The court,
adopting the language of the Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United
States,2 responds as follows:
[T]he protection against [unfairly prejudicial collateral evidence]
emanates ... from four sources: first, from the requirement of Rule
404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second,
from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402-as enforced through
Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make
under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the simi-
lar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice; and fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105,
which provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the
jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the
proper purpose [of determining the defendant's intent].'
Consequently, the other acts evidence is admitted. The fact finder is
exposed to this prejudicial relevant evidence, and then listens to the
defendant's defense of non-involvement. Overwhelmed by the defend-
ant's repeated criminal acts, the jury finds the defendant guilty of the
drug offense. The defendant is sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and
an appeal ensues. The defendant contends on appeal that the district
court erred in not suppressing the incriminating other acts evidence. In
light of the applicable standard of review giving maximum discretion to
the trial judge's Rule 403 inquiry, the court of appeals affirms the
court's admission of the collateral acts evidencing intent.
This hypothetical represents a typical application of the current law
regarding admission of other acts evidencing intent. The current use of
Rule 403 raises a legal concern about whether the witness's testimony is
admitted solely to highlight the propensities of the accused to commit
drug offenses. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Rule 402 relevancy
requirement and the Rule 403 balancing test, coupled with a Rule 105
limiting instruction, sufficiently protect against the admission of unduly
prejudicial extrinsic evidence as the United States Supreme Court has
recently asserted.4
2. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
3. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
4. Id.
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The first part of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 5
provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show action in con-
formity therewith."6 In other words, the government cannot introduce
evidence of other acts committed by an accused in order to prove the
defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. The exclusion of
other acts evidence7 is founded on a fear that the fact finders will view
the accused as a "bad man" and, thus, unacceptably convict the defend-
ant because of his or her other wrongdoings.' The effect that knowledge
of a defendant's extrinsic offenses has on a jury is shown by a study
illustrating that disclosure of a defendant's prior crimes decreases the
likelihood of acquittal from 65% to 38%, in a case otherwise described
as evenly balanced.9
The second part of Rule 404(b), which narrows the scope of the
exclusionary rule, states that "[e]vidence of other crimes ... may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident."10 This Comment focuses primarily on the intent
provision of Rule 404(b).
In United States v. Beechum, t l the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, determined that Congress intended to place greater
emphasis on admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence than the
Supreme Court.' 2 In light of this view, the Fifth Circuit rejected a strict
standard of admissibility which it had enunciated in United States v.
Broadway3 prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 4
5. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence applies to both civil and criminal cases;
Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1984) (civil case); United
State v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1987) (criminal case).
6. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
7. Throughout this Comment, "other crimes evidence" is used interchangeably with the
following phrases: "extrinsic acts evidence"; "extrinsic offense evidence"; "uncharged
misconduct"; "other acts evidence"; "bad acts evidence"; "character evidence"; and "similar acts
evidence." The cited authorities also tend to refer to such evidence interchangeably.
8. United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979).
9. HARRY KALVEN & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966).
10. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). As the language of the rule indicates, the enumerated categories are
not collectively exhaustive. Other exceptions include allowance of the admission of prior crimes
as substantive evidence when it tends to establish a modus operandi, an obstruction of justice, or
the same transaction. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, 557-65
(Edward W. Clearly et al., eds., 3d ed. 1984).
11. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
12. Id. at 910 n.13.
13. 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911-12. The federal courts, relying on the second sentence of Rule
404(b), have departed from the traditional exclusionary approach by treating the federal
propensity rule as an inclusionary rule, authorizing the admission of other crimes evidence unless
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Broadway established two prerequisites to the admissibility of other acts
evidence: first, that the physical elements of the extrinsic offense must
include the essential physical elements of the charged crime; and sec-
ond, that the prosecution establish the physical elements of the collateral
crime by clear and conclusive evidence. 5 In contrast, the Beechum
court established a two-step inclusionary approach for analyzing the
admissibility of other acts evidence.' 6 The two considerations are
whether the other crimes evidence is relevant to an issue other than the
defendant's propensity to commit a crime' 7 and whether the evidence
possesses probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its
undue prejudice.t" In 1988, the United States Supreme Court in Huddle-
ston v. United States 9 adopted the Fifth Circuit position and pronounced
that the relevancy requirement of Rule 40220 coupled with a Rule 403
balancing test sufficiently protected the defendant against unduly preju-
dicial extrinsic evidence."'
the evidence merely proves the defendant's criminal propensities. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 956 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir.
1990); United States v. Wesevich, 666 F.2d 984, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Diggs,
649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981); Beechum, 582 F.2d at 910-11.
See generally, Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 156-63 (1984).
15. Broadway, 477 F.2d at 994. Notably, "conclusive" was later changed to "convincing" in
United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1974).
16. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979).
17. Rule.401 establishes the standard for relevancy: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 401.
18. Rule 403 provides that: "[A]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
19. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
20. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that relevant evidence is generally admissible
while irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Notably, the Supreme Court erred when it interpreted
Rules 401 and 402 as a restriction on the admissibility of other acts evidence to that probative of a
material issue. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685-90. The relevancy standard of Rule 401 is broader
than the "issue in dispute" standard applied in Huddleston. See supra note 17. For a discussion of
a similar interpretation applied by the Second Circuit, see David. F. Guldenschuh, Comment,
Federal Rules of Evidence-Rule 404(b) Limits the Admission of Other Crimes Evidence, Under an
Inclusionary Approach, to Cases Where It Is Relevant to an Issue in Dispute, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. REV. 574, 583-84 (1980). For an application of a broad standard of relevancy analogous to
Rule 401, see United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
868 (1978).
21. The Supreme Court also noted that the requirement of a limiting instruction, Rule 105,
instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted
serves as an additional protection against unfair prejudice to the defendant. Huddleston, 485 U.S.
at 690.
INTENT
The Rule 403 inquiry weighs the incremental probity of the other
acts evidence against its potential for undue prejudice. No mechanical
solution determines probative value.22 The determination involves an
array of factors, such as the similarities between the acts, the effective-
ness of a limiting instruction and the availability of other means of
proof.23
In Huddleston, the Supreme Court asserted that similar acts evi-
dence is admissible "if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding
by the jury that the defendant committed the [collateral] act."' 24 The
replacement of the "clear and convincing" measure of proof, as
espoused by Broadway, with the Huddleston "sufficient evidence" stan-
dard significantly affects the assessment of the incremental probative
value of similar acts evidence because the probability that the extrinsic
act actually occurred is considered when conducting the Rule 403 bal-
ancing. Evidence of an unlawful act cannot have probative value unless
the offense was, in fact, committed and the accused is linked to that act
in a meaningful way.2"
Significant factors affecting the probity of similar acts evidence
under Rule 403 are whether the issue for which the extrinsic offense
evidence is offered is a material issue2 6 with respect to the charged act
and whether the facts of consequence for which the evidence is offered
are being contested.27 The courts have attempted to narrow the scope of
admissibility by adopting language restricting the use of extrinsic acts
evidence to that probative of a genuine issue.28 Arguably, this limitation
suggests that similar acts evidence "meet more exacting standards of
reliability and proof under [R]ule 404(b)"29 than Rules 401 and 402
require in determining whether the evidence falls within an enumerated
exception to Rule 404(b) or serves a purpose other than to draw the "bad
man" inference. Proper application of the "issue in dispute" requirement
is therefore essential when invoking the intent exception to the general
rule of exclusion of character evidence.
22. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979).
23. See id. at 914-17.
24. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
25. McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
to knowingly and intentionally posses with the intent to distribute a controlled substance is a
specific intent offense, thereby permitting the government to introduce other crimes evidence);
United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978);
27. See, e.g., United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1349 (1 ith Cir. 1982); United States v.
Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. See Guldenschuh, supra note 20, at 580; see, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 685 (1988); United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1979).
29. Guldenschuh, supra note 20, at 580.
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Because intent is an element in almost every crime, earlier courts
admitted similar acts evidencing intent only if the court found the requi-
site intent in dispute.30 The courts, in an effort to establish a guideline to
meet this prerequisite, distinguished between "specific intent" and "gen-
eral intent" crimes. Where the prosecution was required to prove spe-
cific intent, other acts evidence was admitted because the intent of the
accused was more than a formal issue.3' However, where the crime
charged only required proof of general intent, the courts precluded
admission of uncharged misconduct. The applicability of the specific/
general intent classification is directly related to the court's calculation
of the incremental probity of similar acts evidence.32
In determining the probity of extrinsic acts evidence under Rule
403, it is important that the judge consider the posture of the case. It has
been asserted that a final determination on admissibility should normally
await the conclusion of the defendant's case, at which time the court
could properly consider whether the evidence is relevant to any disputed
issues.33 The accuracy of a Rule 403 inquiry is contingent upon the
timing of the admission of uncharged misconduct.
The scaling of probative value and potential unfair prejudice under
Rule 403 should take into consideration the defendant's offer to remove
the issue of intent from the case. An accused's offer to stipulate to the
requisite intent or admission as to its existence has a direct impact on the
court's calculation of the necessity for collateral acts evidencing intent.
The aforementioned procedural and substantive considerations are
critical in evaluating the probity and unfair prejudice of uncharged mis-
conduct when determining the admissibility of similar act evidence
under Rule 404(b). The judicial system's application of procedural and
substantive protections for the accused in federal criminal trials, with
respect to prosecutorial use of other acts evidence, has a significant
impact on the Rule 403 inquiry and ultimately on the defendant's ability
to develop a proper defense. This Comment will show that in recent
years the courts have abandoned the procedural safeguards available to
defendants in favor of admitting damaging extrinsic evidence. This
trend is most evident in those criminal cases where the government
invokes the intent exception to the federal propensity rule, Rule 404(b),
30. See, e.g., United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248 (2d Cir. 1978) (denying admissibility of other acts evidence
pursuant to the intent exception to Rule 404(b) because intent was not in issue).
31. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
32. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.5 (3d ed. 1991).
33. E.g., United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650 (2nd. Cir. 1989); United States v. Benedetto,
571 F.2d 1246 (2nd Cir. 1978); United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Jones, 476 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1973); GRAHAM, supra note 32, § 404.5.
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as grounds for admissibility. In recognition of this caselaw, this Com-
ment proposes a procedural approach to assist the courts in accurately
assessing the probative worth of highly prejudicial similar acts evidenc-
ing intent.
II. CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD
The strength of the extrinsic evidence is a relevant consideration in
determining probative value. Prior to Huddleston v. United States,
34
courts required "clear and convincing" evidence that the accused was
guilty of the similar offense.35 This standard has been defined as
"[p]roof which requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt."36 A decade ago, the Sev-
enth Circuit, in United States v. Shackleford, required that the evidence
of prior or subsequent acts be "clear and convincing" as part of its four-
part test to determine whether extrinsic acts evidence should be admitted
under Rules 404(b) and 403. 31 The purpose of this standard was to
ensure that the prosecution's evidence directly established that the
defendant took part in the collateral act, and to shield the accused from
prejudicial evidence based upon "highly circumstantial inferences. 38
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently held in Huddleston39 that
a preliminary showing that the existence of the other crime, wrong or act
is "clear and convincing" is unnecessary. 4° The Huddleston Court held
that extrinsic acts evidence is admissible if there is "sufficient evidence
to support a finding by the jury" that the accused participated in the
similar act.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court,
took special cognizance of the legislative history behind Rule 404(b).42
34. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
35. Rule 104(a) states:
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a). United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alvis v. United States, 484 U.S.
914 (1987); United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1276 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817
(1985); United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d
102, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607, 612
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990).
37. 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 1984).
38. United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979).
39. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
40. Id. at 685.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 687.
1993]
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He noted that Congress was far more concerned with ensuring that limi-
tations would not be placed on the admissibility of other crimes evi-
dence than with the high risk of unfairness of such evidence.43
According to the Court, the issue is one of relevance conditioned on a
fact, that is, that the defendant actually committed the extrinsic
offense."
Consequently, the judge admits Rule 404(b) evidence, subject to
the introduction of sufficient evidence to permit the jury to make the
requisite finding. The determination is a jury question, unless the court
believes that the jury could not reasonably find that the accused partici-
pated in the alleged "bad acts. 45 Moreover, Huddleston requires the
court to determine whether the probative value of the other acts evidence
is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under
Rule 403.46 If the government fails to offer the proper foundation, the
trial court, at the objector's request, must instruct the jury to disregard
the evidence.47
Prior to Huddleston, the Fifth Circuit had rejected the majority
position requiring clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
committed the extrinsic act. In United States v. Beechum,48 the Fifth
Circuit proposed a test of minimal relevancy under Rule 104(b) and bal-
ancing under Rule 403 in lieu of the clear and convincing test estab-
lished in United States v. Broadway.49 Subsequent decisions of the Fifth
Circuit in the mid 1980s agreed with the Beechum minority view. 50 The
First,5 Fourth,52 and Eleventh53 Circuits subsequently adopted the Fifth
Circuit position and admitted other acts evidence if the evidence suffi-
ciently allowed the jury to find that the defendant committed the act.
The underlying justification for abandoning the clear and convincing
requirement enunciated in Shackleford4 and Broadway" was that "the
general protections afforded by Rule 104's threshold relevancy standard
43. Id. at 688.
44. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). This standard of proof is supplied
by Rule 104(b): "Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
45. United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 502 (11th Cir. 1982).
46. 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988).
47. Id. at 690.
48. 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
49. 477 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1973).
50. E.g., United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 952 (5th Cir. 1984).
51. E.g., United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir. 1987).
52. E.g., United States v. Martin, 773 F.2d 579, 582 (4th Cir. 1985).
53. E.g., United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 502 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
54. 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 1984).
55. 477 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1973).
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and Rule 403's added requirement that even relevant evidence be
assessed for possible unfair prejudice are sufficient safeguards against
improper uses of such evidence. '5 6 The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits and District of Columbia courts, however, were not persuaded by
the Beechum position and adhered to the requirement that the govern-
ment prove to the court by "clear and convincing" evidence that the
accused committed the extrinsic acts .5  The Second 8 and Sixth59 Cir-
cuits required the trial court to find that the defendant was the perpetra-
tor of the other misconduct by a "preponderance of the evidence" as a
prerequisite to admissibility.
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Huddleston was an effort
to resolve a conflict among the federal courts. As a result of the Huddle-
ston decision the issue was settled for the lower federal courts. Further-
more, the substitution of the "clear and convincing" standard with a
more relaxed measure of proof places a lighter burden on the govern-
ment and ultimately increases admissibility of other acts evidence.
III. THE INTENT EXCEPTION: AN OVERVIEW
Similar acts evidence in Huddleston was admitted to prove the
defendant's knowledge; however, the Court noted that other acts evi-
dence is critical to the establishment of the actor's intent.6" Criminal
intent has been defined as "that state of mind which negatives accident,
inadvertence or casualty."'" The rationale that the government may
offer evidence that the defendant committed a similar wrongdoing on
other occasions to increase the probability of his intent to commit the
charged crime is based on the doctrine of chances. That is, "the instinc-
tive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of
innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is
perceived that this element cannot explain them all."62 Plainly, the
recurrence of a similar act suggests that it is less probable that a particu-
lar instance of the same act was committed innocently. Unlike some of
the other exceptions in Rule 404(b), the "intent" exception is invoked to
prove an element of the crime.63 In ascertaining the relevance of the
collateral act evidencing intent, one must consider the inference from the
56. Martin, 773 F.2d at 582.
57. See cases cited supra note 35.
58. United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090-91 (2nd Cir. 1975).
59. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir. 1986).
60. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
61. M. C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 KAN L. Rav. 38, 48 (1957).
62. 2 JOHN H. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302 (3d ed. 1940).
63. 22 CHARLES A. WRITrr & KErN A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5242 (1978).
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prior act to the requisite intent in the crime charged. The intent excep-
tion and other exceptions such as, motive, knowledge, or common
scheme overlap because the latter require an additional inference as to
some accompanying mental state.64 It has been suggested that the intent
exception be read broadly so as to include any necessary mental element
of a crime whether knowledge, accident or absence of mistake.65 Quite
naturally, the intent category has been one of the most frequently
employed for admitting extrinsic acts evidence.
The courts differ on when intent is an actual issue in dispute for
purposes of applying Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. Some courts allow
relevant collateral crimes evidence when specific intent, as opposed to
general intent, is an element of the crime.66 Prior to the adoption of
Rule 404(b), federal courts prohibited admission of extrinsic offense evi-
dence to prove intent where intent was not seriously in issue.67 Hence,
where a defendant stipulated that he possessed the requisite intent, this
served to remove intent as an issue in the case, precluding the govern-
ment from admitting similar acts evidencing intent.68
IV. SPECIFIC INTENT Vs. GENERAL INTENT
Mid-twentieth century courts required specific intent as an element
of the crime to ensure that uncharged misconduct evidencing intent was
used to establish a matter in genuine dispute. 69 The distinction drawn
between "general intent" and "specific intent" is ambiguous. However,
the common usage of "specific intent" is to designate a unique state of
mind beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of
the crime.7 ° Where a crime requires proof of specific intent, the prose-
cution must prove that the accused knowingly committed (or failed to
commit) an unlawful act, purposely intending to violate the law.7 The
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. United States v. Williams, 816 F.2d 1527, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
probative value of the other similar crimes evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect
where the assaults required proof of defendant's specific intent to do bodily harm).
67. E.g., United States v. Buckhanon, 505 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974). For a discussion
of the federal practice prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Thomas J. Reed,
The Development of the Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L.
REV. 299, 305-07 (1982).
68. Buckhanon, 505 F.2d at 1083 n.I. But see infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
69. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the courts recognized the
distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes. See, e.g., Bloch v. United States,
221 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding that it is error to charge presumptive intent where
specific intent is an element of the crime charged). For offenses falling under the "specific intent"
classification see, e.g., cases cited infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
70. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 28, 202 (1972).
71. 1 EDWARD J. DEvrIr & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
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Burger Court, in an attempt to set a standard for. defining the intent ele-
ment of crimes, stated that "[iun a general sense, 'purpose' corresponds
loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowl-
edge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent. '7 2 Consis-
tent with this view is that a charge of knowingly or intentionally
committing the alleged unlawful acts does not create a specific intent
crime.73
Extrinsic acts evidence has been used in the prosecution of specific
intent crimes, such as entering a credit union with an intent to commit
larceny,74 conspiring to possess with an intent to distribute heroin,75
assault with a dangerous weapon with an intent to do bodily harm,7 6
attempting to evade payment of income taxes,77 and conspiring to com-
mit bank fraud.78 The federal courts have also permitted introduction of
other crimes evidence to prove specific intent in prosecutions for posses-
sion of cocaine with an intent to distribute,79 wire fraud,8" and mail
fraud.8' These decisions have rested on statutory language setting forth
the elements of the offense to admit or exclude evidence of prior acts.82
The rationale for admissibility in these cases is that because specific
intent is an essential element of the crime charged, it cannot be inferred
from the act. The government is required to prove that the defendant
specifically intended the consequences of his wrongdoings. Under this
INSTRUCTIONS § 13.03 (2d ed. 1970). The prevailing view in jurisdictions recognizing the
specific/general intent classification is that because intent is an element of proof in specific intent
crimes, the defendant cannot bar the government from submitting evidence to prove an element of
an offense. E.g., United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that
where the government charges the accused with a specific intent crime, the prosecution has the
automatic right to present other crimes evidence despite the defendant's attempt to concede the
issue).
72. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980).
73. United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 539 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the offense
of "knowingly and unlawfully" distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is not a
specific intent crime). But see United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that the charge of conspiracy to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, with an intent to distribute
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is a specific intent crime). The court in
Manganellis distinguished Liefer on the grounds that conspiracy is a separate offense from the
crime of knowingly distributing cocaine. Manganellis, 864 F.2d at 534.
74. United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1989).
75. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1499 (7th Cir. 1990).
76. United States v. Williams, 816 F.2d 1527 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
77. Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955).
78. United States v. Harrod, 856 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1988).
79. United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1989).
80. United States v. Bradford, 571 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 908
(1978); United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978).
81. United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985).
82. See Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1499; Harrod, 856 F.2d at 1001; Wiedman, 572 F.2d at 1202.
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approach, the need for such evidence strengthens its incremental proba-
tive value in the Rule 403 balancing process.
The Seventh Circuit has used a similar rationale for barring admis-
sion of other acts evidence where the crime charged does not require
proof of specific intent. In United States v. Shackleford,13 the court dis-
tinguished between situations where intent is at issue because the
charged crime includes an element of specific intent and where intent
can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The court found
that the offense of attempting to collect a debt by use of extortionate
means did not require proof of specific intent and disapproved admission
of similar misconduct. 84 Similarly, in the case of United States v. Grut-
tadauro,s5 the court excluded extrinsic evidence in a prosecution of a
union business agent for willfully receiving money from an employer
because specific intent was not an element of the crime charged. The
court noted that the mental state of willfulness was more analogous to a
general intent crime than to a specific intent crime.8 6 In addition, admis-
sion of other acts evidence has been barred in prosecutions for second
degree murder, 7 possession of a firearm by a felon,88 and obstruction of
justice, 9 because general intent could be inferred from the commission
of the act itself.
The justification for admitting similar acts evidence is that the gov-
ernment, in a general intent crime, need not prove "separately and
directly" 9 the state of mind of the accused. Thus, when weighing the
probity of an extrinsic act evidencing intent against its unfair prejudice,
the necessity for other acts evidence does not justify admission under the
intent provision of Rule 404(b). On the other hand, when a statute
requires specific intent, the prosecution has an extra burden of proof that
requires admission of other acts evidencing intent.
Nevertheless, the distinction between specific and general intent
has been highly criticized. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Judge Rives in the concurring opinion of Baker v. United
States91 expressed his disapproval of barring the admission of prior con-
victions simply because the crime charged does not require proof of spe-
cific intent.92 He noted that to have the court "reason from the abstract
83. 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984).
84. Id.
85. United States v. Gruttadauro, 818 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 1328.
87. United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 1987).
88. United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1986).
89. United States v. Schaffner, 771 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1985).
90. Id.
91. 227 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1955).
92. Id.
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legal definition of the crime backward, rather than from the acts of the
defendant forward to the intent with which they were done" creates con-
fusion and erroneously excludes crimes not requiring specific intent
from application of the exception to Rule 404(b).93 Relying on Judge
Rives's opinion, the Fifth Circuit announced in United States v.
Adderly94 that whether intent is a material issue depends on the circum-
stances of the case and on the nature of the offense and not on statutory
language.95 The court, without citing any supporting caselaw, stated that
in every case where the Fifth Circuit denied admissibility of other acts
evidence because of lack of specific intent there were additional grounds
for the exclusion.9 6 Criticizing the prerequisite for admission estab-
lished in earlier decisions, the court permitted the government to intro-
duce evidence of prior convictions to establish general intent.97 The
panel, in a conclusory fashion, stated that the "offense of conspiracy by
its very nature requires an element of intent or knowledge." 98 Therefore,
prior misconduct which tends to establish the conspiracy is admissible
pursuant to the intent exception.99
The Fifth Circuit court in Beechum'0° focused on other considera-
tions in assessing the incremental probative value of the extrinsic
offense evidence instead of recognizing the well-established distinction
between specific and general intent crimes. In Beechum the defendant
was accused of unlawfully possessing a silver dollar stolen from the
mails. The court's extensive analysis of the application of the Rule 403
test favored the admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence notwithstand-
ing the fact that the relevant statute did not require proof of specific
intent nor did the accused place his intent in issue by asserting mistake
or lack of intent.
The Beechum court, relying on Rule 401 Advisory Committee's
Note, 1° 1 explained that other acts evidence is relevant with regard to an
uncontested issue.10 2 The court, however, suggested that exclusion of
extrinsic acts evidence offered to prove a fact not in dispute is justified
because the probative force of such evidence is outweighed by the dan-
93. Id.
94. 529 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 1181.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1180. Admittedly, the applicable statutes setting forth the elements of the
conspiracy offense did not specifically refer to intent or knowledge.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1976).
100. 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
101. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note.
102. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914 n.19.
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ger of undue prejudice. 03 This approach relies on the judicial balancing
of interests."° Thus, the federal courts have discretion in deciding
whether the probative value of the character evidence is outweighed by
its unfair prejudice. 05 According to the Beechum court, Rule 403 bal-
ancing uniformly results in the exclusion of similar acts evidencing
intent when the defendant's intent is not at actual issue in the case.' °6
The Beechum °7 opinion in the late 1970s was followed two years
later by the same court in United States v. Roberts. °8 However, in
applying the prejudice evidence rule, 10 9 the court did not balance the
trial concerns in favor of the defendant."t 0 The absence of a specific
intent crime was again immaterial because collateral evidence "as may
be probative of a defendant's state of mind is admissible unless [the
accused] 'affirmatively take[s] the issue of [general] intent out of the
case.' ,"I A similar formulation was recently applied by the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Ospina."2 Without mention of the statutory
elements of the charge, the per curiam opinion held that the probative
value of the extrinsic evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
undue prejudice.' 1 3 The court merely provided the similarity of the con-
victions as the reason for affirming the district court's admission of the
103. Id. at 914. This approach assumes that other crimes evidence has "any tendency" under
Rule 401 to make the existence of a consequential fact more probable, even if it relates to an
uncontested issue.
104. In Beechum, however, the court in dictum stated that where the issue of intent is
uncontested, the extrinsic acts evidence, although highly probative, is uniformly excluded. Id.
105. The trial judge's discretion in balancing the Rule 403 scales is very broad and only rarely
will a district court's judgment be reversed. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d
153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.
1988).
106. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979).
107. 582 F.2d at 898.
108. 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to operate illegal gambling business).
109. FED. R. EvID. 403; see supra note 18.
110. Roberts, 619 F.2d at 383.
111. Id. Apparently, the court in Roberts did not recognize the distinction between specific
intent and general intent crimes. This same court in United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178,
1180 (5th Cir. 1976), noted that a conspiracy charge did not require proof of specific intent. See
supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. The panel in Roberts was primarily concerned with the
unique nature of conspiracy charges and the difficulties of proving intent when a defendant is
accused of conspiring. Despite the court's reliance on Beechum, the court refused to adopt the
policy suggested in Beechum of excluding other crimes evidence when intent was uncontested.
Moreover, the Roberts court noted that the defendant's offer to not actively contest the issue of
intent was insufficient because of the burden on the government to establish general intent.
Roberts, 619 F.2d at 383.
112. 823 F.2d 429, 433 (11 th Cir. 1987) (knowingly possessing marijuana with an intent to
distribute).
113. Id.; see also United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710 (5th Cir. 1980) (willfully shooting
a passing helicopter).
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other crime.' 14
Contemporaeneously, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hatfield
allowed admission of other wrongs evidencing intent even though the
court recognized that the crime of being a felon in possession of a fire-
arm did not require proof of specific intent.1 5 The court's reasoning
was based on the fact that intent could not be inferred from proof of
possession even though the statute required proof that the defendant
knowingly possessed the gun.' 1 6 This decision is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's earlier pronouncement that a charge of knowingly com-
mitting a wrongful act (a general intent crime) does not justify admis-
sion of collateral acts evidence. 17 The Sixth Circuit's disregard for the
specific/general intent classification is further demonstrated by its hold-
ing that intent is not inferred from the commission of the act itself in a
"general intent" crime. 118
The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits are in accord with the view
that other acts evidence is relevant and admissible to prove intent
whether or not the crime charged requires proof of general or specific
intent.' 19 Beechum120 and its progeny suggest that the specific/general
intent classification is no longer regarded as a consideration in evaluat-
ing the incremental probative value of other acts evidence.
When the balancing process of Rule 403 is applied, there is a
greater tendency to admit other crimes evidence. This tendency of the
courts to overvalue the probity of such evidence is shown by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's recent pronounce-
114. Id. Notably, the opinion did not articulate a Rule 403 analysis; rather, the court, in a
conclusory fashion, held that the two-prong test for admissibility was met.
115. 815 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit, a year prior to Hatfield, barred
admission of other acts evidencing intent in a prosecution for being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm, because specific intent was not required and general intent could be
inferred from commission of the act. United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 1986).
116. Hatfield, 815 F.2d at 1072.
117. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
118. Hatfield, 815 F.2d at 1072.
119. See, United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1992)(failing to classify the
statutory offense of conspiring to distribute marijuana as a specific intent crime while recognizing
this classification in United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hutchins, 818 F.2d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 1987)(focusing on the similarities between the charged
crime and the collateral crime as grounds for admissibility in a prosecution for conspiracy to
possess marijuana with an intent to distribute); United States v. Bourgeois, 746 F.2d 401, 405 (8th
Cir. 1984)(holding that the other crimes evidence was relevant and probative without the court
considering the nature of the crime charged or the issue in dispute requirement); United States v.
Adcock, 558 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1977)(allowing similar acts evidence to show motive in
prosecution for general intent crime for extortion); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUcr EVIDENCE § 5:09 (1984).
120. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ment that they "lean towards admitting evidence in close cases." 121
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit's existing practice of using Rule 403
sparingly to exclude similar acts evidence fails to protect criminal
defendants from unduly prejudicial evidence.' 22 The post-Huddleston123
decisions suggest that the courts prefer balancing the Rule 403 trial con-
cerns in favor of the government.124 This trend is evident in the govern-
ment's use of prior convictions and misconduct as substantive evidence
in recent drug cases. 125 Beechum 'S126 earlier prediction that judicial
application of the relevancy rule and Rule 403 would protect defendants
from the admission of unfairly prejudicial extrinsic evidence has not
come true.
Perhaps the courts have disregarded the distinction between spe-
cific intent and general intent crimes because of the difficulties with
placing every offense neatly into one of the two categories. In addition,
the Supreme Court did not clearly distinguish the cateogires.' 27 Never-
theless, the recent trend to disregard this classification strips the courts
of a useful guideline for determining whether intent is an actual issue in
the case thereby making it necessary to admit uncharged misconduct
evidence. The inability of the courts to properly apply the Rule 403
analysis articulated by the Beechumt2 8 court signals the need for specific
guidelines to assist the judiciary in determining probity of extrinsic evi-
dence. The courts' failure to replace the specific/general intent classifi-
cation with a procedural protection creates additional uncertainty in
ascertaining whether the "issue in dispute" standard will be properly
applied.
121. United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825
(1990) (quoting United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1062 (1990)).
122. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1048 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 594
(1991).
123. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 927 F.2d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated
in part, on reh'g en banc, 967 F.2d 294 (1992); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 754 (6th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 883 (1992); United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th
Cir. 1988).
125. United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 491 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that in a prosecution
for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, the prejudicial effect of prior misconduct testimony did not
substantially outweigh its probative value); United States v. Aranda, 963 F.2d 211, 216 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1421 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 522-23 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375
(10th Cir. 1989).
126. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
127. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
128. 582 F.2d at 914-17.
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V. TIMING OF ADMISSION OF SIMILAR ACTS EVIDENCE
In addition to a weakened application of the specific intent and gen-
eral intent crime distinction, there is a trend among the circuits to cir-
cumvent the timing rule that requires courts to defer admission of "bad
acts" evidence until the conclusion of the defense's case.' 29
No requirement in Rule 404(b) delineates the proper time to intro-
duce extrinsic acts evidence. As discussed earlier, the court must first
determine that the evidence is relevant to the case before weighing the
probity of other acts testimony and the undue prejudical effect. Logi-
cally, the timing of the introduction of extrinsic evidence pursuant to the
intent exception is greatly important, because intent may not be a real
issue until the defendant's case is presented.
As a general rule, the government should wait until the defense
concludes before introducing other crimes evidence under the intent
exception. 130 This limitation applies to both specific intent and general
intent crimes. 13' The underlying design of the timing rule is that if the
government introduces the extrinsic evidence when the defense rests, the
court then will best be able to balance the probative value of and the
necessity for such evidence against the unfair prejudice to the defend-
ant. 132 The federal courts, however, have created exceptions to the tim-
ing rule that basically have negated the rule's value. 133 The basic reason
for the exceptions is the concern that if the government does not present
specific intent evidence in its case-in-chief, the government at the con-
clusion of the defense may be foreclosed from introducing such evi-
dence if the defendant rests without presenting evidence. 34 Although it
is the role of the judge to consider whether to admit the other acts evi-
dence during the government's case-in-chief, the current application of
Rule 403 signals the demise of this procedural safeguard and the advent
129. E.g., United States v. Simon, 842 F.2d 552, 554 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Reed,
639 F.2d 896, 906-07 (2d Cir. 1981);
130. E.g., United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Adderly,
529 F.2d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jones, 476 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTmIN's EVIDENCE § 404(09) (1992);
GRAHAM, supra note 32, § 404.5.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 69-90 (for a discussion of the specific/general intent
classification).
132. GRAHAM, supra note 32, § 404.5.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984) (crime charged
requires proof of specific intent); United States v. Gilmore, 730 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a plea of not guilty required the government prove every element of the offense,
including intent); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 1979) (opening statement
suggested lack of general intent in a prosecution for extortion); United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d
348, 361 n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977) (lack of general intent foreshadowed
by introduction of evidence not objected to by defendant).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 137-171.
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of permitting the government to assume that intent will come into
issue.1
35
A series of Second Circuit cases suggests that the timing rule nor-
mally should be applied to ensure that the similar acts evidence specifi-
cally reaches an issue in dispute. 36 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
recently narrowed the application of the timing rule. The Second Circuit
first refused to apply the timing rule in the early 1980s in United States
v. Reed.'37 The court in Reed approved the government's introduction
of extrinsic acts evidence during its case-in-chief because it was
"already apparent" that the issue of specific intent would be con-
tested. 38  Six years later in United States v. Caputo,139 the court
expanded the meaning of "apparent" used in its earlier decision 40 to
include circumstances where the government was required to prove the
defendant's specific intent. 4 ' According to the court, this requirement
automatically made the defendant's intent a real issue, thereby allowing
the government to introduce the accused's previous acts during its case-
in-chief. As a result, the Second Circuit's former policy'12 of requiring
the prosecution to withhold uncharged misconduct evidence until rebut-
tal was eroded.
The Second Circuit decisions are not the exception in the federal
courts; rather, they are in line with the majority view. In fact, the Sec-
ond Circuit's disregard for the timing rule pales in comparison to that of
135. The standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United
States v. Caputo, 808 F.2d 963, 968 (2d. Cir. 1987); United States v. Crocker, 788 F.2d 802, 804
(1st Cir. 1986).
136. E.g., United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Figueroa,
618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249 (2d Cir. 1978).
137. 639 F.2d 896, 906-07 (2d Cir. 1981).
138. Id. The court based its ruling on the fact that the defendant refused the government's
request to stipulate to knowledge and intent. id. The court did not raise as an actual issue the
existence of either specific intent or general intent, even though mail fraud and securities fraud
charges require proof of specific intent. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 80-84.
139. 808 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1987).
140. Reed, 639 F.2d at 906.
141. Caputo, 808 F.2d at 968. The government was required to prove that the defendant
possessed unauthorized access devices with an intent to defraud. Id. Although the court did not
refer to the crime charged as a specific intent crime, arguably, this offense fits into the 'specific
intent' category. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Simon,
842 F.2d 552, 554 (1st Cir. 1988) (approving admission of other acts evidencing general intent to
commit a drug offense during the government's case-in-chief when the defendant suggested that
he would contend lack of intent in his opening argument, despite his later admission of use of
marijuana); United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990)
(noting that, in a trial for possession of counterfeit obligations, the government can introduce
extrinsic evidence during its case-in-chief if the defendant raises the issue of general intent in his
opening statement).
142. See United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Figueroa,
618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249 (2d Cir. 1978).
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the other federal courts. For instance, the Fifth Circuit Stated in the early
1980s that the government could introduce similar acts evidence to
prove intent initially because the government cannot predict whether the
defense will contest the issue.1" 3 This view assumes that, irrespective of
the actual defense, intent will be an actual issue in the case. Thus, the
court applies the balancing test of Rule 403 early in the case, assuming
that the evidence is necessary and relevant to a potential issue in dispute.
A majority of the courts make this assumption to avoid the timing rule,
including the Second Circuit which introduced the principle prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 44
A. Specific Intent Exception
Rather than taking the Fifth Circuit route of openly rejecting the
timing rule, other courts have circumvented the rule by creating excep-
tions. For instance, the Seventh 4 5 and Eighth 146 Circuits consistently
have upheld the introduction of other acts evidence during the govern-
ment's case to establish intent for specific intent crimes. The courts jus-
tify this exception because the statutorily imposed burden of establishing
specific intent affords the prosecution an absolute right to present such
evidence even though the defendant attempts to remove the issue by
either conceding the requisite intent or denying commission of the
act. 147  The courts view extrinsic evidence as necessary because the
accused's defense does not impact the government's burden."' 8
This approach has been attacked by Judge Cudahy, in a concurring
143. United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Roberts, 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980). Although in Renteria the defendant conceded intent during
his defense, the court found that the government had no way of anticipating this with certainty at
the time it presented its case. Renteria, 615 F.2d 1281-82 The charged offense involved a
conspiracy to possess illicit drugs with an intent to distribute. Despite the court's failure to
recognize that this crime requires proof of specific intent, this offense has been categorized as a
specific intent crime. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 361 n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842 (1977) (ruling that in an
armed robbery and murder trial it was not plain error to permit the government to introduce
extrinsic acts evidence during its case-in-chief where lack of general intent was foreshadowed by
evidence the defendant did not object to being admitted).
144. United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 1965).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781
(7th Cir. 1984).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Burkett, 821 F.2d 1306, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987).
147. See cases cited infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (for a discussion on the recent
treatment by the courts of a defendant's attempt to concede the issue of intent and make it
irrelevant).
148. United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978).
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opinion, 149 which suggested that the government "cannot simply flood
the courtroom with other-crimes evidence on the grounds that the crime
was one of specific intent."150 Instead, Judge Cudahy recommends that
the courts adhere to the general rule that extrinsic acts evidencing spe-
cific intent cannot be admitted unless the defendant disputes intent.1 51
This view, consistent with the Second Circuit's reasoning in United
States v. Manafzadeh, 52 permits a defendant to remove the issue of spe-
cific intent as an issue in the case, thereby precluding admission of
extrinsic evidence. Thus, even when the prosecution must prove spe-
cific intent, the point at which it may introduce uncharged misconduct
evidencing intent remains a significant factor because the evidence must
be reasonably necessary in light of the government's other available evi-
dence under Rule 403. Nonetheless, only a minority of circuits have
followed this rule since the mid 1980s. t53
B. Entrapment Defense Exception
The courts have recently dispensed with the timing rule to permit
introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence during the prosecution's
case where an entrapment defense is raised in the defense's opening
statement.1 54 The seminal case on the use of other acts evidence to rebut
a defense of entrapment is Sorrells v. United States.t55 In this case, the
court justified its conclusion on the grounds that a defendant seeking
acquittal by reason of entrapment is not in a position to object to the
government's search for relevant character evidence to prove disposi-
tion.' 56 The Seventh Circuit, 57 however, broadened the scope of Sor-
rells by permitting the prosecution to introduce dissimilar acts evidence
to rebut an entrapment defense. In United States v. Murzyn,15 1 the
149. United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 813 (7th Cir. 1985). Although Judge Cudahy
disagreed with the majority's reasons for upholding admission of the evidence on the question of
intent, he found the evidence to be admissible under other exceptions to Rule 404(b).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 592 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that, in a case of transporting fraudulent checks, it
was error to admit other acts evidence when intent was not in dispute).
153. See cases cited supra notes 145-48.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Parkin, 917 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 741 (11 th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107 (1982). But cf. United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694,
695 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the government cannot introduce rebuttal evidence in its case-in-
chief in anticipation of an entrapment defense that was referred to in opening argument, but never
actually materialized).
155. 287 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1932).
156. Id.
157. United States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
158. Id.
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defendant was charged with interstate transportation and sale of stolen
automobiles.1 59 In an attempt to rebut the accused's defense of entrap-
ment, the government introduced evidence that Murzyn threatened to
kill a federal agent, solicited services for an assassination, used crude
sexual language and displayed a shotgun to an undercover agent., 60
Applying the balancing approach of Rule 403, the court affirmed the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a mistrial. 16'
The introduction of extrinsic acts evidence to rebut an entrapment
defense in Sorrells and Murzyn was permitted only after the defense had
presented its case and subsequent to the defendant's clear assertion that
he was entrapped by federal agents. Thus, the court was in a position to
examine whether such evidence was narrowly geared to rebut the precise
issues raised by the accused. However, where the government
introduces uncharged misconduct evidence during its case-in-chief to
rebut a defense of entrapment raised during a defendant's opening state-
ment, the admission is permitted at a time when the defense has not yet
materialized.' 62 Therefore, the court can not determine whether the
rebuttal evidence closely tracks the manner in which the accused
presents the entrapment defense. Instead, the courts must predict the
nature and extent of the defendant's response and assume that the incre-
mental probative value of the character evidence, in light of the
imagined defense, outweighs its potential prejudicial effect.' 16 3
C. "Not Guilty" Plea Exception
Whether a not guilty plea sufficiently raises the issue of intent to
make extrinsic offense evidence admissible in the government's case-in-
chief is a question that the Sixtht61 and Seventh 65 Circuits answered in
the negative two decades ago. This view is squarely on point with the
requirement that there exist an actual dispute on the issue to which the
prejudicial evidence is relevant. As Lord Sumner stated in Thompson v.
The King, "[t]he prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy
159. Id. at 526-27.
160. Id. at 528.
161. Id. at 531.
162. See cases cited supra note 154.
163. The courts also have been reluctant to apply the timing rule where the defense has
suggested in its opening statement that the evidence to be produced by the defense might generate
uncertainty. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Olsen, 589 F.2d 351, 352 (8th Cir. 1978). For example, in a prosecution for drug related offenses,
the Seventh Circuit recently held that the issue of specific intent raised during opening argument
opens the door to similar acts evidence. United States v. Parkin, 917 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.
1990).
164. United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1975)(dictum).
165. United States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1969).
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defences [sic] in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning
piece of prejudice."' 66 Nevertheless, this attitude is currently the minor-
ity position among the circuit courts. Where the accused pleads "not
guilty" to the crime charged, a majority of the courts have consistently
permitted the government to use other crimes evidencing intent as part
of its case-in-chief. 167 This view is premised on the incorrect belief that
a not guilty plea is sufficient to make all the elements of the charged
crime, including intent, 168 a real issue in the case, thereby creating the
prosecution's need for such other crimes evidence.' 69 Even where the
government has had no reason, other than the defendant's not guilty
plea, to anticipate a denial of criminal intent, the admission of character
evidence is upheld. 70
The serious flaw with this approach is that a not guilty plea does
not necessarily give rise to the inference that the accused did commit the
unlawful act charged, but rather did so without the required intent.
However, absent additional grounds, this assumption is a prerequisite to
a finding that the requisite intent is a real issue. In light of the inability
of the courts to draw such an inference, it follows that such a position is
inconsistent with the traditional view requiring a material issue as to the
defendant's intent. Nevertheless, the courts summarily conclude that a
plea of not guilty sufficiently raises the issue of general or specific intent
which warrants admission of uncharged misconduct during the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief.' 7' This illogical approach highlights the importance
of giving the government an opportunity to prove its case with all avail-
able evidence and the triviality of affording the defendant a right to a fair
trial free from unnecessary prejudicial evidence.
VI. DEFENDANT'S OFFER TO REMOVE ISSUE OF INTENT
The ultimate question of admissibility of other acts evidence pursu-
ant to the intent provision of Rule 404(b) is affected by the defendant's
actions. In balancing the probity and prejudice of extrinsic evidence
166. 1918 App. Cas. 221, 232 (appeal taken from Crim. App.).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Gilmore, 730 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 426 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383 (5th
Cir. 1980).
168. The courts do not distinguish between specific intent and general intent. For example, the
statutory offense of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, clearly fits into the category of specific intent
crimes. See supra note 81. However, a charge of conspiracy to operate an illegal gambling
business, 18 U.S.C. § 371, does not require proof of specific intent. See supra text accompanying
note 111.
169. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 119, § 8:10.
170. See e.g., Roberts, 619 F.2d at 382.
171. See cases cited supra note 167.
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under Rule 403, the court must inquire into whether the defense truly
disputes the material fact of consequence that the similar acts evidence
is offered to prove.' 72
A defendant's offer to stipulate to the existence of a material fact
impacts on the incremental probative value of the extrinsic evidence.
The Second Circuit maintains that an unequivocal offer to stipulate to
the existence of the requisite intent removes intent as an issue in the case
and, thus, precludes admission of uncharged misconduct. 7 3 This view
is premised on the notion that once the defense offers to stipulate to a
particular issue there is no need for other acts evidence.' 74 Nevertheless,
the Second Circuit position is the minority view. 75 In lieu of adopting a
per se rule either for or against admission of relevant other acts evidence
when the defendant offers to stipulate, the Third Circuit merely incorpo-
rates the offer as one factor in the Rule 403 balancing process.17 6 This
court, however, applies the prejudice evidence rule, Rule 403, with the
belief that "it is for the prosecutor, not the defendant, to shape the gov-
ernment's trial strategy with a view toward sustaining its heavy burden
of proof."
' 177
The prevailing concern for the prosecution's opportunity to present
the complete picture of its case has led other courts since the late 1970s
to hold that an offer to stipulate does not necessarily result in exclusion
172. United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 941 (2d Cir. 1980); GRAHAM, supra note 32,
§ 404.5.
173. United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Mohel, 604
F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1979).
174. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 111, § 8:11.
175. Interestingly, the First Circuit in United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1174-75 (1st Cir.
1993), in refusing to consider the defendant's offer to stipulate to knowledge and intent, attempted
to distinguish the Second Circuit decisions. Id. (citing United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934,
940 (2d Cir. 1980) and United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1979)).
In Mohel, the defense argued that the alleged sale of cocaine was a complete fabrication.
Mohel, 604 F.2d at 753. Similarly, the defendant in Figueroa alleged that the unlawful conduct
never occurred. Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 940. In Garcia, however, the accused did not assert the
absence of drugs in his closet; rather, he claimed that he was not aware of their presence and
offered to concede knowledge and intent in the event the jury found that he in fact possessed the
cocaine. Garcia, 983 F.2d at 1174.
Arguably, a defendant who claims lack of knowledge and possession of the presence of drugs
or stolen property as a defense, although presently living or otherwise associated with a place
where such items were found, may not stipulate with respect to the questions of knowledge or
intent while maintaining that "it is not mine" or "I don't know anything about it." In other words,
where a defendant sets forth a "mere-presence" defense, the court is not likely to recognize an
offer to stipulate. Conversely, an accused will be permitted to stipulate to knowledge or intent
when his defense is lack of identification, i.e., "there was no crime" or "it was not me."
176. United States v. Schwartz, 790 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1986); see also United States v.
Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1498 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
177. Schwartz, 790 F.2d at 1061.
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of similar acts evidence. 178 The general rule is that the prosecution is
not bound by the accused's offer to stipulate.1 79 Moreover, where the
defendant offers to stipulate to the issue of intent in a specific intent
case, the trial judges' weighing of the unfair prejudicial impact of other
acts evidence is minimal compared to the alleged probativeness of the
evidence.18 0 The basic notion is that a defendant cannot bar the prosecu-
tion's offer to prove an element of the offense and remove the need for
such evidence simply by offering to stipulate. Thus, in cases requiring
proof of specific intent, an offer to stipulate will rarely affect the balanc-
ing test so as to warrant exclusion of Rule 404(b) evidence.'
A defendant can also remove an actual issue of intent from a case
by expressly admitting the existence of a material fact without offering a
formal stipulation. Theoretically, it should be more difficult for the
prosecution to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence where the defense has
agreed not to contest the requisite intent as compared to when the
defendant has not entered into such an agreement.' 82 The courts, how-
ever, usually rule that the defendant's testimony does not preclude the
government from introducing similar acts evidence.' 83 The case law
highlights that a defendant's concession of intent does not affect the
necessity of the evidence when balancing the probative force of the
extrinsic evidence against its prejudicial effect.' 84 This is most apparent
where the crime charged involves proof of specific intent. 185
On the other hand, the Second Circuit reaches a more sensible
result based on the rationale that a formal stipulation is not necessary
where the defendant clearly expresses a decision not to dispute the issue
of specific intent.'86 The Second Circuit explains that it is the signifi-
178. United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
486 (1992); United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964
(1986); United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945
(1979). But see United States v. Buckhanon, 505 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that the
requisite intent was not in issue because the defendant was willing to stipulate to the material
fact).
179. Peltier, 585 F.2d at 324.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1992) (conspiring to distribute
and possess cocaine with an intent to distribute).
181. Id.
182. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1980).
183. E.g., United States v. Mergist, 738 F.2d 645, 650 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v.
Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279, 1282 (5th Cir. 1980)); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383 (5th
Cir. 1980) (conspiracy case); United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied
sub. nom. Citro v. United States, 498 U.S. 864 (1990).
184. See, e.g., Spillone, 879 F.2d at 520.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1022 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 939 (1990) (entry in a credit union with an intent to commit larceny).
186. E.g., Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 942 (2d Cir. 1980) (conspiring to possess and distribute heroin
with an intent to distribute).
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cance that the trial court attaches to the words, rather than the form of
the words used by the defense, that determines whether a particular issue
remains truly in dispute.18 7 Nevertheless, the view that an offer not to
contest the requisite intent affirmatively takes the issue out of the case is
the minority position. 88
VII. SUMMARY/PROPOSAL
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the prosecution may not
introduce evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct to prove his
or her propensity to commit the charged crime. Such evidence is admis-
sible, however, for other purposes, such as proof of motive or intent.
18 9
When invoking the intent exception to the federal propensity rule, the
court must weigh the probative value of the similar acts evidence against
the potential danger of unfair prejudice. After Huddleston, this discre-
tionary balancing process, coupled with the relevancy determination of
Rules 401 and 402, is the only evaluation the courts engage in when
determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts. Thus, to avoid arbitrary decisions, the courts need to follow estab-
lished guidelines when evaluating the prejudicial effect of extrinsic acts
evidence.
The courts in the past have pronounced procedural and substantive
safeguards, such as the timing rule and the specific/general intent classi-
fication, that have aided the courts in determining admissibility of such
evidence under the intent exception. Nevertheless, the judicial treatment
of these protections suggests that they are ineffective.
When the Beechum court first relaxed the requirements for admis-
sion of similar acts evidence in the late 1970s, many courts were still
properly addressing considerations that were a legitimate part of the
Rule 403 balancing process. By the mid 1980s, however, many circuits,
in light of the influential Beechum view, replaced the requirement that
the prosecution prove commission of the extrinsic act by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence with the "sufficient evidence" standard of proof. The
Supreme Court adopted this approach at the end of the decade.1 90 As a
result of Huddleston, there is a lighter burden imposed on the govern-
ment for introducing other acts evidence.
The abandonment of the specific/general intent classification
removed an additional obstacle to the government's admission of extrin-
sic evidence. The courts began announcing their disregard for the dis-
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 183.
189. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
190. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
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tinction between specific and general intent crimes immediately after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9' This position gained gen-
eral acceptance by the late 1980s.' 92 Yet, the modem trend deprives
trial judges of a useful guideline for determining whether the requisite
intent is genuinely in dispute and whether the extrinsic evidence is incre-
mentally probative as determined by the government's actual need for
such evidence. This results in an even more discretionary balancing test
to apply that, as illustrated by the post-Huddleston cases, strengthens
judicial preference for scaling the trial concerns in the government's
favor.
Furthermore, the prevailing concern for the prosecution's opportu-
nity to present all relevant evidence encouraged the federal courts to
limit the applicability of the timing rule. The courts have gone so far as
to assume early in the case that a genuine issue of intent exists establish-
ing a preponderant need for evidence of uncharged misconduct. Natu-
rally, the courts contemplate the accused in fact raising the issue of
intent coupled with the introduction of extrinsic acts evidence possess-
ing maximum incremental probity. The fiction that such evidence is rea-
sonably necessary for the prosecution affects the balancing process of
Rule 403. Thus, the greater weight on the probative value side of the
scale tips the balance away from the unfair prejudice concern. The
courts' refusal to apply the timing rule questions their ability to fairly
determine the probative value and undue prejudice of extrinsic acts evi-
dence at a time when it is unknown if such evidence is directed at the
issues raised by the accused.
Finally, the recent cases involving a defendant's offer to remove the
intent issue from the case as immaterial when determining incremental
probity highlight the courts' compelling concern for giving the govern-
ment an opportunity to present the complete scope of its case. This Rule
403 application questions whether the courts can really apply the "issue
in dispute" limitation while forbidding the defendant from removing this
prerequisite to admission. Recent caselaw suggests that the defendant's
actions do not affect the genuine need for similar acts evidence under the
Rule 403 balancing test.
The failure of the courts to properly address these considerations is
inconsistent with the strict prohibition against admitting evidence under
the intent provision of Rule 404(b) unless intent is an actual issue in
dispute. The lack of discernible standards to guide application of the
intent aspect of Rule 404(b) and Rule 403's balancing approach pre-
191. United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178-80 (5th Cir. 1976).
192. United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1987).
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cludes trial judges from adequately assessing whether intent is a real
issue.
One could assert that a solution to this dilemma is to follow the
Huddleston approach,193 eliminating the clear and convincing standard
of proof, and to go further and simply abandon the remaining considera-
tions, such as the distinction between specific and general intent crimes,
the timing rule, and the defendant's willingness to remove the issue of
intent. This would result in a total disregard for the requirement that
there exist an actual issue of intent as a prerequisite to invoking the
intent exception to Rule 404(b). The text of Rule 404(b), arguably, does
not require the existence of a contested issue to which the other acts
evidence is relevant.194 The negligent application of the Rule 403 bal-
ancing test in the post-Huddleston cases, however, illustrates the inade-
quacy of this solution.' 95 This scaling process is an empty gesture that
results in the mechanical admission of other acts evidence, in spite of the
policies underlying Rule 404(b). In addition, the current standard of
review which affords trial courts maximum discretion in applying the
balancing test provides no appellate safeguard against the negligent
application of the Rule 403 balancing test.
Moreover, seventy five years before the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the common law forbade admission of other acts
showing intent unless intent was a genuine issue. 196 If the prosecution
offers extrinsic evidence to prove a material fact in issue, the evidence is
incrementally probative and necessary for the government to prove its
case. If the prosecution does not present the evidence to rebut an issue
raised by the accused, it is exceedingly plausible that this prejudicial
evidence merely highlights the defendant's propensities to commit
wrongful acts. Absent language indicating otherwise, one can not
assume the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence intended to disre-
gard the sound common law practice of applying the "intent in issue"
requirement when invoking the intent exception to Rule 404(b). To
ascertain whether the proffered evidence legitimately meets this require-
193. The Supreme Court provided a four-step framework for determining the admissibility of
other acts evidence: first, the Court mandated that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose
under Rule 404(b); second, the Court announced the relevancy requirement of Rule 402, as
enforced through Rule 104(b); third, the Court instructed trial courts to determine whether the
potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403 substantially outweighs the probative value of the
extrinsic evidence; and fourth, the Court required the trial judge, upon request, to instruct the jury,
under Rule 105, that the other acts evidence must be considered only for the purpose for which it
was offered. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-91.
194. Relevancy is governed by Rule 401. See supra note 17.
195. See cases cited supra note 125.
196. See supra note 68.
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ment, the courts therefore need to follow the discernible guidelines that
the recent courts have disregarded.
Notably, the repudiation of the requirement that evidence of prior
or subsequent acts be clear and convincing reflects the courts' liberality
in admitting highly prejudicial evidence. This trend runs counter to the
philosophy expressed in a dissenting opinion in United States v. Con-
ley.' 97 According to Judge Lay, "[t]he rule that evidence of other crimes
shall not be admissible in the trial of a criminal case is rooted in the due
process concerns that a man should not be tried for crimes without
notice of the charges, nor should he be forced to defend against a con-
fusing mass of unrelated allegations." '198 The introduction of highly
prejudicial extrinsic acts evidence that fails to meet the clear and con-
vincing standard of proof denies a defendant the right to a fair trial. 199
Contrary to Judge Lay's statement, the Supreme Courts' current pro-
nouncement in Huddleston inhibits the federal courts from demanding
a standard of proof more stringent than the "sufficient evidence"
requirement.
There is still room, however, for the reawakening of the specific/
general intent classification. The requirement of specific intent as an
element of the crime charged where the accused has not actually raised
the issue of intent would provide the courts with a standard for determin-
ing the incremental probative value of collateral acts evidence. By rec-
ognizing the specific/general intent classification and its underpinnings,
the courts can apply the Rule 403 balancing process in an impartial
fashion.
Moreover, the judicial inquiry of Rule 403 can be improved by
establishing a formula that considers the defendant's attempt to remove
the issue of intent from the case. If the prosecution offers evidence of an
uncontested issue, the admission of extrinsic evidence in the circum-
stances clearly defeats the "issue in dispute" requirement set forth by the
early courts. The Rule 403 process cannot be properly applied if the
courts ignore the lack of a genuine need for similar acts evidence.
Proper consideration of the defendant's actions would further assist the
courts in adequately determining the real incremental probative value of
collateral crimes evidence.
A prevailing concern influencing the relaxation of the requirements
for admissibility of similar acts evidence is that the prosecution may be
197. United States v. Conley, 523 F.2d 650, 659 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920
(1976).
198. Id.
199. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 1973) (Widener, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
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precluded from proving its case if the defendant rests without introduc-
ing evidence or offers a general denial. This concern is most evident in
the courts' refusal to apply the timing rule. Nevertheless, the courts can
follow the general rule requiring the prosecution to introduce other
crimes evidence during rebuttal without disregarding the government's
need to prove its case. A practical and rational solution would be to
prohibit the government from introducing character evidence during its
case-in-chief, reserving the right to reopen to present such evidence in
the event the defendant rests without introducing evidence. Thus, even
if the court considered intent a significant issue (because the charged
crime requires proof of specific intent or the accused denies the requisite
intent) the safer course would be to allow the accused the opportunity to
present its defense before admission of such evidence. This would
enable the trial judge, at the conclusion of the defense, to determine
whether intent is really in dispute so as to warrant the admission of other
acts evidence. The court would then be in the best position to assess the
probative worth of the evidence against it prejudicial effect. If the
defendant fails to present a defense and an actual issue exists as to the
perpetrator's intent, the court may subsequently admit the evidence. The
trial judge, in such a situation, can inform the jury that the court com-
pelled the government to defer admission of its extrinsic acts evidence.
The application of this approach would render useless any exception to
the timing rule. In addition, it would give the trial judge the opportu-
nity, before ruling on the admissibility of such harmful evidence, to con-
sider the defendant's willingness to remove the issue of intent from the
case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental characteristic of
our criminal procedure system. Yet, Rule 404(b) evidence tends to draw
the attention of the jurors away from the substantive issues on trial
toward the defendant's bad character. The rule expresses the concern
that the accused will be tried for his or her uncharged misconduct rather
than for the crime charged. 2" The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were aware that the introduction of other acts evidence encour-
ages fact finders to draw the subjective "bad man" inference. The
Supreme Court recognized almost half of a century ago that such evi-
dence is "said to weigh too much with the jury and to overpersuade them
as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair oppor-
200. United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979); see supra text accompanying
note 8.
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tunity to defend against a particular charge."2 ° The soundness of this
conclusion is apparent, despite the Second Circuit's recent observation
that the prejudicial effect of extrinsic evidence is minimal where the
collateral crime and the charged crime are equally "sensational" and
"disturbing. 2 °2 Thus, to ensure that a defendant receives a fair and
unbiased trial, federal courts must limit admission of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence. This demands the accurate weighing of the probative
force of the evidence against its undue prejudicial effect. However, the
application of this naked balancing process alone is not sufficient to
limit the admission of other criminal acts. Clear standards to guide
application of the intent aspect of Rule 404(b) must be considered in
conjunction with the trial concerns of Rule 403 in order for the federal
propensity rule and the balancing test to have their intended effect.
VIVIAN M. RODRIGUEZ
201. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
202. United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992).
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